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Introduction 
Bolivia is an economically poor nation whose per capita 
income is higher than only a couple of countries in the Americas. 
It was one of the first nations to default on its foreign debts 
during the 1980s, it has recently suffered hyperinflation, its 
major export (cocaine} is illegal, it has trouble collecting for 
natural gas exports, and its traditional primary export (tin) has 
declined to less than 1/4th of the value it was a few years ago. 
Despite recent progress in stabilizing the economy, these severe 
problems limit the ability of the government to save and to 
marshall capital for development. This does not mean, however, 
that individual Bolivians do not save. 
In the following discussion we report on recent research 
done in Bolivia on informal rotating savings and credit 
associations (RoSCAS)--locally called pasanakus. Our results 
support the thesis that extensive capacities to save voluntarily 
exist even in the poorest countries. We conclude that defects in 
policies, rather than deficiencies in human savings behavior, 
inhibit the mobilization of more of these savings into formal 
financial market deposits. 
Background on RoSCAS 
RoSCAS are an informal institution in which groups of 
individuals save, share risks, and also borrow. Other closely 
related types include non-rotating savings and credit 
associations (NRoSCAS), youth clubs, church groups, pilgrimage 
funds, burial societies, and mutual help groups (Fatmi; Malone 
and Ahmed; Miracle; and Miracle and Cohen). RoSCAS do financial 
intermediation on a small scale in many countries (Bouman, 1977). 
Their basic elements typically include membership of six to forty 
individuals, a leader who handles the collection and distribution 
of funds, contribution of a fixed amount to a pot by members at 
fixed intervals, and distribution of the pot in rotation to 
members by drawing lots. RoSCAS intermediate among savers and 
borrowers, allow some to get a given amount sooner than they 
could through auto-saving, and allow others to save more than 
they might otherwise do. 
RoSCAS are found in countries as diverse as Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Zaire in Africa; in Belize, the 
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Dominican Republic, Jamaica, St. Kitts/Nevis, and Trinidad-Tobago 
in the Caribbean; in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru in Latin America; 
and in India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam in Asia. They have also 
been reported among migrant groups in the United States (Bonnett; 
Light; and Velez-Ibanez), and we have documented RoSCAS operating 
among employees in the International Monetary Fund in Washington 
and among employees of the Central Banks in Belize, Bolivia, the 
Dominican Republic, and the Philippines. RoSCAS appeal to a 
broad range of economic classes, can be found in economies at low 
as well as high levels of development, and appear in numerous 
permutations as they are adapted to local conditions. 
The functions of RoSCAS range from almost entirely social to 
purely economic (e.g. Geertz, Barton). In some cases, RoSCAS may 
evolve over time as economic objectives engulf social functions 
(Begashaw; Haggblade; and Nayar). They can play an important 
socializing role for both the poor and the well-to-do. Velez-
Ibanez, for example, found that RoSCAS played an important social 
role among the relatively poor in both Mexico and in the u.s. as 
a way of building mutual trust (confianza) among members. Soen 
and Comarmond found the same thing occurring in cameroon. We 
also found cases in Bolivia where groups of well-to-do women 
formed RoSCAS as a way of buying an expensive birthday gift, in 
rotation, for group members. 
In contrast, Barton found RoSCAS among wealthy rice 
merchants in Vietnam who used them to finance major investment; 
we found the same thing occurring among poor people in Bolivia, 
and Haggblade reports similar activities in Cameroon. RoSCAS are 
flexible enough to serve either social or economic functions in 
all social classes. 
The importance of RoSCAS is generally underestimated because 
most of their activities occur informally. It appears that a 
significant portion of the adult population in many countries 
participate, at least occasionally, in RoSCAS. This raises 
interesting questions: Why are RoSCAS so popular? What services 
do they offer that are not provided by formal financial 
intermediaries? And, what can be learned from RoSCAS that might 
be useful for policy makers and formal financial intermediaries? 
Description of Research 
Until recently relatively little has been said in the 
literature about RoSCAS in Latin America as most studies of these 
associations focused on Africa or Asia. Studies in Mexico, Peru, 
and the Caribbean, however, are showing that RoSCAS are also 
common in the Americas (Katzin, Levin, Norvell and Wehrly, Velez-
Ibanez). 
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During the summer of 1987 we investigated RoSCAS in Bolivia 
by doing structured interviews with 470 individuals located in 
five of the largest cities: 323 in La Paz, twenty-eight in Santa 
cruz, twenty-eight in Cochabamba, twenty-four in Oruro, and 
sil.ty-seven in Sucre and in several communities around La Paz 
(V!acha, El Alto, and El Lago). These individuals provided 
information on 453 separate pasanakus. In addition, we briefly 
interviewed an additional 450 people in lines waiting for buses 
and customers in central markets about their participation in, or 
knowledge of pasanakus. We did not do extensive interviewing in 
rural areas, but our impressions are that RoSCAS are much less 
common among campesinos in Bolivia. They are frequently found, 
however, among merchants and professionals living in rural 
communities. 
The term pasanaku appears to be a contraction of a Spanish 
word pasar and an Aymara word naka. The u ending may have its 
roots in the other major native language spoken in Bolivia--
Quechua. Pasar indicates a game while naka connotes a fixed time 
and place for the game. 
The genesis of pasanakus is unclear. It is traditional for 
farmers in Bolivia to exchange labor through "mingas" and to 
participate in cooperative land tenure relationships. Other 
traditional forms of lending or bartering in Bolivia include 
trueque, ayne, and chuk'u. It is unclear if Bolivia's pasanakus 
evolved out of these ancient systems of rural cooperation, were 
imported, or emerged spontaneously. Some social scientists in 
Bolivia argue that the playing of pasanakus arose with the 
introduction of money by the Spanish and gradually expanded as 
the use of money became more common. 
The fact that RoSCAS are common in some places in the 
Americas where large numbers of Indians exist, including Bolivia, 
suggests that pasanakus may have evolved out of traditional 
systems of cooperation--pooling of labor may have logically lead 
to pooling of money. In countries such as the Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, where most of the 
indigenous population was killed by colonists, RoSCAS were likely 
imported by migrants from Africa or Asia. 
Our structured interviewing was not done on a random basis 
as we tried to uncover as many pasanakus as possible, collect 
information on the characteristics of pasanakus, assemble reasons 
for members participating, and also collect information on the 
motivation and characteristics of organizers. We conducted 
interviews in most of the major urban occupational groups, in 
many of the important urban businesses, and we interviewed 
employees in about 20 formal financial institutions. In 
addition, we also asked for estimates, from the persons 
interviewed, of the proportion of all employees in their offices 
(organizations) who were currently participating in pasanakus. 
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RoSCAS in Bolivia 
We found pasanakus are common in urban areas. They appear 
to be approximately equally popular in the largest cities (La 
Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz) along with the smaller cities 
such as Oruro, sucre, and towns and communities around La Paz. 
As can be seen in Table 1, in the organizations where we did 
interviews, eight to twenty-four percent of the employees were 
known by the person interviewed to participate in at least one 
RoSCA within the office or place of business. These percentages 
are conservative estimates since some of those who were listed as 
nonparticipants may have been members of other pasanakus outside 
the office, or members of other RoSCAS within the organization, 
but unknown by the person we interviewed. Also, the percentages 
in Table 1 do not capture all of the employees in an office who 
occasionally participate in RoSCAS, but who were not members at 
the time of our interview. In addition, about ten percent of 
those interviewed reported they or their spouse were also 
concurrent members of other pasanakus. 
In addition to the 470 structured interviews with pasanaku 
members, we also did brief random interviews with approximately 
450 adults waiting in line for buses and shopping in the central 
markets in all of the urban centers where we did research. These 
individuals were asked two questions: Are you currently 
a member of a pasanaku, and are you familiar with how a pasanaku 
operates? As can be noted in Table 2, the responses showed that 
thirty to forty percent of those interviewed, depending on city, 
currently played in a pasanakus, and an additional eighteen to 
twenty-five percent were very familiar with the operations of 
RoSCAS. Only thirty-eight to fifty percent of the people 
interviewed claimed not to be very familiar with pasanakus. 
This information suggests that a sizable portion of urban-
adult Bolivians are, or have been, pasanaku members--one-third or 
more. An even higher percentage of urban households likely have 
at least one member participating in a RoSCA--perhaps up to one-
half. In a few urban locations most adults are members of 
RoSCAS. In one hotel in La Paz virtually all of forty employees 
were regular members of at least one pasanaku. In several of the 
central markets where we did interviewing, almost all of the 
permanent workers in these markets regularly participated in at 
least one pasanaku. 
Surprisingly, we also found that pasanakus were common among 
employees of most formal financial intermediaries: commercial 
banks, development banks, the Central Bank, and the apex 
organization of the credit unions. This raises interesting 
questions about the benefits employees realize from participating 
in pasanakus that they cannot realize from the financial 
institution in which they work. 
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General Characteristics of RoSCAS 
As can be noted in Table 3, the average size of membership 
in the pasanakus surveyed was ten with a range from five to 110. 
On average, sixty percent of the total membership of the 
pasanakus surveyed were women and nearly ninety percent of the 
groups were composed largely of friends or fellow workers. Only 
three percent of the groups surveyed were made up largely of 
family members and only five percent were composed of neighbors. 
In some countries it is common for several people to split a 
single share in a RoSCA, or for one individual to make 
contributions through several shares (Lamberte and Bunde). This 
appeared not to be common in Bolivia as the number of shares, on 
average, was about equal to the number of members of the groups. 
Eighty-three percent of all the RoSCAS surveyed collected and 
distributed only cash. Many of the remaining RoSCAS collected 
cash and distributed some commodity. Nearly six in ten of all 
the pasanakus surveyed allowed the organizer to take the first 
pot. 
One of the most surprising findings of the study was the 
relatively large amounts of money people were putting into 
pasanakus. In terms of u.s. dollars, the average person 
contributed $17.80 to the pasanakus surveyed at each collection 
period. For those paying a full share every two weeks this 
amounted to about $35.00 per month. The largest share payments 
tended to be made in RoSCAS in offices whose members were 
professionals, while the smallest share payments occurred in 
pasanakus whose members were mostly market ladies paying daily 
shares. 
The range in the length of time between payment of shares 
was one to fifty days, with a median of fifteen. Shares were 
collected daily in fifteen percent of the pasanakus surveyed, 
five percent assembled shares every week, fourteen percent every 
ten days, twenty-two percent every two weeks, and thirty-eight 
percent each month. We were surprised to find that about two-
thirds of the pasanakus surveyed were conducted in u.s. dollars. 
People interviewed reported that prior to 1985, when the 
inflation in the country reached it peak, only twenty percent of 
the pasanakus in which they participated used dollars. It 
appears that the number of pasanakus using dollars, however, 
declined during 1987 as inflation expectations of Bolivians 
receded. 
The most popular method of determining the rotation of the 
pots was through the drawing of lots at the time the pasanaku was 
organized with nearly seventy percent of the groups choosing this 
method. Another fifteen percent drew lots each time the pots 
were distributed, about ten percent assigned the rotation 
following the order of members joining the group, and a small 
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number of groups did the rotation informally on the basis of 
need. It is interesting to note that none of the RoSCAS surveyed 
used a bid system to determine rotation that is common in Asia 
and also found occasionally in Africa (Barton, Haggblade, Nayar). 
Bolivians enjoy many forms of gambling, including lotteries. 
This propensity may partly explain the popularity of pasanakus: 
some individuals have fun being members of RoSCAS. The perceived 
benefits of being lucky and drawing an early lot exceeds the 
costs of being unlucky and getting a late position. Some people, 
nevertheless, may prefer to get their distribution late because 
of timing with targeted purchases. While informal techniques of 
determining rotation position have the advantages of flexibility-
-someone who badly needs the money early can negotiate with the 
organizer or other members for such a position--they also raise 
the possibilities for hurt feelings and group discord. The bid 
system includes the luck and fun feature, lessens the inter-
personal conflict that may arise from allocating positions on the 
basis of subjective criteria, allows those who badly need the 
funds early to bid a high discount and get the funds when they 
most need them, and also allows those members of the group who 
are most interested in saving to consistently bid very small, or 
no discounts, and receive their distribution late along with a 
high rate of return on their savings. 
One possible disadvantage of the bid system is that an 
unscrupulous person might bid a high discount, get the pot, and 
then skip town. This problem is largely avoided in some of the 
RoSCAS in Cameroon where the leader of the group assigns the 
ration. Members who have proved their reliability by 
successfully participating in previous rounds of the RoSCA 
receive early positions in the rotation, while new members, young 
people, and those who do not have an excellent reputation get 
positions late in the rotation (Soen and Comarmond). In our 
study, we did not find cases where members must prove their 
creditworthiness before they moved up in the rotation. 
Types of Pasanakus In Bolivia 
We found three types of pasanakus: simple office groups; 
more complex groups, often found in central markets, that 
included an organizer who received a commission; and pasanakus 
that were used by merchants and banks to promote the sale of 
goods such as clothing, furniture, food, appliances, automobiles, 
and mortgages. We label these three types office, commission, 
and promotional pasanakus. Bouman (1984) found in Indonesia and 
Sri Lanka some non-rotating associations (NRoSCAS) that assembled 
funds for some participants to visit holy places. NRoSCAS are 
also very popular in some Middle Eastern and African countries. 
We ran across no NRoSCAS in Bolivia, however. 
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The most popular form of RoSCA in Bolivia is the office 
2asanaku; about three-quarters of the groups we surveyed were of 
this type. Most offices and businesses in the major cities have 
at least one pasanaku among its employees. Typically the office 
pasanaku has ten members, the majority women, who each contribute 
the same amount of cash to a pot every fifteen or thirty days. 
The organizer of these groups is often informally selected, but 
may be someone who needs a relatively large amount of cash and 
solicits co-workers to join a pasanaku. It is more typical for 
the organizer to be a senior employee who can be trusted to 
handle the collection and distribution of funds. Sometimes the 
group organizers are allowed to take the first distribution as 
compensation for their troubles, but, more typically, the 
organizer of an office pasanaku receives no special 
consideration. 
As an aside, the average number of people in a RoSCA in 
Bolivia was smaller than those reported by researchers in other 
countries. This may have been due to the recent hyperinflation 
that caused Bolivians to want to turn their funds around 
relatively quickly by having small groups and keeping the time 
between distributions of the pots relatively short. 
The rotation of the pot is usually decided by lot at the 
time of the organization of the pasanaku, or by lot among the 
"non-winners" at the time each pot is collected. In some cases 
the organizer of the group has an implied obligation to make up 
for any defaults by members they invite to participate, 
especially if the organizers receives special consideration in 
the allocation of the pots. It is more typical, however, for all 
members to share equally in any losses experienced by the office 
group. 
A few of these office pasanakus have a social function and 
give the members a feeling of togetherness through participation. 
This includes getting together for lunch or drinks each time a 
pot is collected and distributed. It is much more common, 
however, for the organizer to collect money and then pass the pot 
to the "winner" without interaction among other members of the 
group. Typically, the group does not meet for organizational 
purposes as individuals simply sign up for participation with the 
organizer. We were surprised by how few social functions these 
office pasanakus provided. Less than 10 percent of the office 
RoSCAS surveyed appeared to have a significant social function. 
The next most important form of RoSCA was the commission 
pasanaku found in many of the urban markets where the organizers 
usually receive payment for their services. About fifteen 
percent of the RoSCAS we surveyed were of this type. In some 
cases, the organizer may manage several pasanakus at one time and 
in other cases they may manage a pasanaku as part of other 
marketing activities. We found women organizers who were 
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managing up to six pasanakus and who had organized in excess of 
100 RoSCASs in their lifetime. These organizers may or may not 
be people who regularly work in central markets. 
The most common commission form is for the organizer to 
receive a payment out of each pot collected that ranges from two 
to thirty percent, the average being ten percent. The 
professional organizer may also have the option of taking the 
first pot and in some cases not having to pay shares. It is also 
common for professional organizers to have the use of money 
collected until it is distributed to a winner. In some cases, 
money is collected daily but distributions are only made every 
week or even up to every fifty days. Organizers who take a 
percentage, get the first pot, are not required to contribute a 
share to subsequent pots, and who are also allowed to use the 
money contributed to pots between distributions, receive a 
substantial reward for their efforts. In a few cases the 
organizer, typically a women, may live almost exclusively on her 
earnings from managing pasanakus. It is more typical for the 
organizer's pasanaku earnings to be only part of their total 
income. 
As with the office pasanakus, the most common membership 
size for the commission pasanakus is ten, but we found commission 
groups that had over 100 members. Many of the collections are 
made daily, but some of the groups contributed money to a pot 
every five or ten days. The short time between collections may 
have given organizers more control than if long periods of time 
were involved. Also, daily collections may have been an 
accommodation to inflation. If shares are collected daily and 
pots are distributed daily, the complete cycle for a 100 members 
pasanaku would be less than four months. In most cases the 
allocations of the pot were made on the same frequency as funds 
were collected--e.g. daily collection, daily pots. It was not 
uncommon, however, for funds to be collected more frequently than 
pots were distributed--e.g., collecting funds daily, but only 
giving out a pot every five days. The organizer of the 
commission RoSCA often has a strong moral obligation to make good 
any defaults in payment to the pasanaku by individuals she had 
recruited. 
There was even less social interaction among members of 
commission pasanakus than was found in the office form. In many 
cases the organizer is the only common connection among members 
of the group. 
The third type of RoSCA, the promotional pasanaku, is 
organized by merchants and even bankers who are attempting to 
increase their sale of goods or services. Five to ten percent of 
the RoSCAS surveyed in Bolivia were of this type. It appears 
that this method of boosting sales became prominent with 
inflation between 1982 and 1986. In Oruro, for example, many 
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merchants started promotional RoSCAS three-to-four years ago to 
sell almost any relatively expensive item. The recent economic 
stress among miners in Oruro may have been a factor that forced 
merchants to offer pasanakus as a way of sustaining sales. Some 
merchants were forced to use pasanakus as a way of meeting 
competition. The promotional pasanaku was less prominent in the 
other cities where we did interviewing, but we did run across 
some interesting cases in all of the cities. 
The Banco de la Union in La Paz, for example, has asked the 
central Bank for permission to organize pasanakus whose members 
would assemble funds necessary to make down-payments on 
apartments or houses. Three RoSCA sizes, tailored to various 
sizes of properties, were proposed by the Bank: pots of five, 
ten, and fifteen thousand {U.S.$). Each pasanaku would have 
twenty members and each winner of the pot would have enough money 
to make the twenty-five percent down-payment required by the 
Bank. The Bank, in turn, would accept this down-payment and then 
extend a loan for the remaining seventy-five percent based on a 
mortgage. Pasanaku payments would be made at the end of each pay 
period. 
Car dealers, furniture stores, appliance stores, merchants 
selling food items, and even tailors organize pasanakus as a 
substitute for installment payments to increase sales. We found 
a number of merchants in the central markets of La Paz, for 
example, who used pasanakus to promote sales of cans of edible 
oil, sacks of flour or sugar, and almost any other relatively 
large food staple. Typically, the members of these food-
promotional pasanakus were other individuals working in the 
markets, collections were made daily, and distributions made each 
week. The number of participants, the amount of money 
contributed for each share, and the period between distributions 
of the pot varied, depending on the total value of the item 
distributed by the merchant. A common contribution was one 
bolivian peso {U.S. fifty cents) each day. 
A hypothetical tailor pasanaku illustrates the benefits 
realized by the participants in this system. Twelve individuals 
may agree to purchase a suit from a tailor through a six-month 
pasanaku. Each member agrees to pay a pasanaku share of 1/12th 
of the value of a suit to the tailor every two weeks. A drawing 
of the non-winners is held every two weeks to establish who will 
get their suit next. 
There are obvious advantages for both the tailor and his 
customers in using pasanakus. The advantages for the twelve suit 
buyers are that all of them, except one, can acquire a suit 
sooner than if they were forced to auto-save for six months 
before they had enough money to purchase the suit. Further, if 
the buyer wanted to buy the suit on credit and then make the 
installment payment, this would, in most cases, involve paying an 
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interest charge, a payment that the buyer avoids through the 
pasanaku. This interest charge would almost certainly be larger 
than the rate of interest he would receive through depositing his 
money in a bank regularly for six months and then buying the 
suit. Thus, on average, a participant in a pasanaku receives his 
suit earlier than he would otherwise and incurs smaller implicit 
and explicit financial charges. 
Merchants are interested in pasanakus because they promote 
sales. Compared to normal installment payments, the pasanaku 
cuts down the default risks for the tailor. To illustrate this 
point, assume that the tailor has the option of selling twelve 
suits immediately and then collecting bi-weekly payments from the 
twelve buyers through installments paid over six months. Or, the 
tailor can make the same number of sales under a pasanaku, hand 
out one suit each two weeks, and collect an amount equal to the 
value of a suit twice a month. Under the installment arrangement 
any of the twelve suit buyers can default on payments during the 
six months, to the disadvantage of the tailor. Under the 
pasanaku, on average, only half of the members can default and 
hurt the tailor; if a pasanaku member defaults on his payments, 
and he has not received a suit, the tailor simply refuses to give 
him a suit. The loan recovery risks for the tailor are less 
under the pasanaku than for installment payments, and, 
furthermore, pasanakus are a cheap way for the seller to expand 
sales, given that the seller is forced to make sales on credit. 
We have heard of promotional RoSOAS in other countries 
experiencing high rates of inflation: Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 
Making sales through RoSCAS is a way for both the seller and the 
buyer to manage and reduce the risks of inflation. It appears 
that the interest in promotional pasanakus has waned in Bolivia 
during 1986-81 as the rate of inflation sharply declined. 
Members' Responses 
It can also be noted in Table 3 that, for the average person 
interviewed, their pasanaku share payment averaged almost one-
sixth of total salary (seventeen percent). Since about ten 
percent of those interviewed, or their spouses, were members of 
several pasanakus concurrently, the total portion of salaries 
going into RoSCAS was somewhat higher than our reported figures. 
Approximately three-quarters of those individuals providing 
information through the structured interviews had participated in 
one to five pasanakus, nearly one-quarter had participated in 
six-to-ten RoSCAS, and three percent had participated in more 
than ten pasanakus. 
One of our most important findings was the reason members 
gave for participating in a pasanaku. Ninety-one percent of the 
470 members interviewed said their main reason for joining was to 
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save! Only six of the people interviewed said that getting a 
loan was their main reason for joining. This is in sharp 
contrast to the basic assumption behind most government- and 
donor-sponsored credit projects: i.e, that the primary motivation 
for most people wanting to deal with a financial system is to 
borrow. We found little evidence that business people used 
pasanakus to finance substantial investments, a practice common 
in several Asian and African countries. 
It was also interesting to find that only eight percent of 
the members remembered ever having problems in a pasanaku. This 
response, combined with the fact that pasanakus continue to be 
extremely popular in the country, strongly suggests that there is 
little default in pasanakus and that members feel they are 
benefiting by participating in them. The loan recovery 
performance in Bolivian RoSCAS is in marked contrast to the loan 
default problems suffered by government banks. 
Few of the members of RoSCAS interviewed had accounts in 
formal financial institutions; only sixteen percent of those 
interviewed, or their spouse, had a checking or a savings account 
in a bank or a credit union. More than three-quarters of those 
interviewed felt that RoSCAS provided them with more benefits 
than banks. About one-third of those interviewed felt that 
participation in pasanakus had increased with inflation, 
suggesting that use of formal financial institutions had 
declined. 
Organizers of Pasanakus 
We interviewed forty-six individuals, mostly women, who were 
currently organizers or managers of pasanakus. Two-thirds of 
them received no compensations for their efforts, the remaining 
one-third received a commission or percentage of the funds they 
collected for their efforts. Most of them, three-in-four 
organized the pasanaku for economic rather than social reasons. 
Those who organized pasanakus for social reasons were all 
involved in office RoSCAS. In contrast, the organizers of the 
commission and promotional pasanakus almost always realized 
material gains for their efforts. The comisionista gains 
directly from the commissions collected and from the use of 
interest-free money between the time money is collected and when 
pots are distributed. The gains for the promotional pasanaku 
organizer were the net increases in income realized by additional 
sales made possible through offering customers the possibilities 
of making purchases through pasanakus. 
A large majority of the office and commission pasanaku 
organizers are women, in sharp contrast to the very limited 
number of women found in high-level positions in Bolivia banks. 
The extensive participation of women, both as organizers and 
members of pasanakus, may show that women have more difficulties 
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in gaining access to formal financial services than do men and 
that their opportunity costs of organizing pasanakus is also 
lower. 
Conclusions 
We were surprised to find that pasanaKu membership was so 
widespread, that they handled such a large amount of money, and 
that people were putting such large percentages of their income 
into them. While the shrinkage of the formal financial system 
from 1982 to 1986 forced some financial transactions into the 
informal arena, it appears that pasanakus were common prior to 
the recent dose of inflation and that they are far from being 
transitory. This extensive participation leads us to the same 
conclusion that Adam Smith arrived at over 200 years ago when he 
said " •.• the principle which prompts us to save •.• comes with us 
from the womb, and never leaves us till we go to the grave" 
(Wealth of Nations, p. 324). 
Widespread pasanaku participation shows that the majority of 
Bolivians living in urban areas are eager and willing to save in 
financial forms, even when inflation is nearly overwhelming. 
While we did not spend much time probing rural savings behavior 
it is likely that, while many Bolivian campesinos are poor, they 
still want and need to save. The immense investments made by 
small coca (cocaine) producers in the Chapare region over the 
past ten years are vivid reminders that poor farmers in Bolivia 
will save and invest, given attractive opportunities. 
There are at least six reasons for the popularity of 
pasanakus in Bolivia. First, borrowers' transactions costs in 
pasanakus are almost nil. In contrast, these costs can be 
relatively large if RoSCA participants attempt to deal with 
formal financial intermediaries. Second, pasanakus are flexible 
and easily adjusted to the needs of the members. In contrast, 
the terms on most formal deposits and loans are quite inflexible. 
Third, saving in a pasanaku is tied to--the mirror image of--
building a credit rating and borrowing. Most savers are also 
interested in getting a loan and others want to build 
relationships that allow them to borrow in case of emergency. 
This is often not possible through formal intermediaries that 
only extend targeted loans. Fourth, for many people the value of 
these joined financial services exceeds the value of separate 
borrowing and deposit services. This helps explain the lack of 
failures among pasanakus in Bolivia, while the results of 
targeted formal credit programs have been disappointing. Fifth, 
transactions costs in pasanakus are low because of numerous 
innovations. In contrast, innovations in formal financial 
markets are often warped by regulations and this generally 
results in increases, rather than decreases, in the total costs 
of financial intermediation. Sixth, Bolivians enjoy playing 
pasanakus because of the gambling aspect and because it is an 
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attractive form of "forced savings," features not generally 
offered by formal financial intermediaries. 
In short, pasanakus are popular because they are providing 
the financial services most often demanded by individuals in 
Bolivia, while the formal financial intermediaries often do not. 
Returning to the theme we advanced in the introduction, we 
conclude that the failure to mobilize more savings via deposits 
in the formal financial system is due to faulty policy rather 
than defective individual savings propensities. The results of 
this study suggest that major changes are needed in the way 
government and donors help Bolivia dig out of its financial hole. 
Clearly, previous attempts by the Bolivian Government--in concert 
with donors--to borrow its way out of poverty have been a 
failure. Bolivia's main problem do not result from citizens who 
are unwilling or too poor to save. Bolivia continues to be a 
poor country, but many of its citizens are substantial and 
aggressive savers via pasanakus. The main development problem 
faced by the government is how to provide opportunities and 
incentives for people in Bolivia to hold more of their savings in 
formal financial market deposits. 
The implications of this for donors are several. First, 
they must be careful not to undercut government incentives to 
mobilize intra-country savings through offering substantial 
external capital assistance. Rather, donors must encourage more 
autarky in savings. It is often much easier for a government to 
negotiate a loan for millions of dollars from an international 
donor than it is to do the grubby work of mobilizing small 
amounts of deposits from its own citizens that may sum to an even 
larger total. Donors must be careful not to discourage this 
difficult, yet important activity. 
Second, donors must be careful not to create or reinforce 
polices in financial markets that may discourage internal 
mobilization of funds. Concessionary rediscount facilities in 
central banks (vehicles for handling donor funds), high reserve 
requirements, and extensive use of targeted credit programs all 
discourage deposit mobilization. Donors can easily beget a 
highly patronal formal financial system that has little incentive 
to mobilize deposits. 
A final word. In contrast to the formal financial system in 
Bolivia which is severely stressed, withered, and lacking in 
innovations, the informal financial system--as seen through the 
pasanakus--is alive and well. It is apparent that the recent 
expansion in the informal financial system has allowed a large 
number of people and firms in the country to survive, despite 
tremendous economic turmoil. Much can be learned from studying 
this informal system about the types of financial services that 
14 
people prefer, as well as learning how to reconstruct the formal 
financial system on more efficient and equitable lines. 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Employees Participating in Intra-Office 
Pasanakus in Selected Organizations in Bolivia, 1987 





































Percentage of People Informally Interviewed Who 





























* Results of brief unstructured interviews with about 450 people 
who were standing in line waiting for buses or making purchases 
in central markets in mid-1987. 
** Includes informal interviews done in towns around La Paz: 
Viacha, El Alto, and El Lago. 
Table 3: Characteristics of 453 Pasanakus 
In Bolivia 
-----------------------------------------------------------------Item Mean Median St. Dev. Range 
-----------------------------------------------------------------No. of Members 10.8 10 6.6 5-110 
No. of Women 6.4 6 4.2 0-40 
No. of Shares 10.2 10 3.7 10-40 
Share Value ($US} 17.8 10 21.9 .5-250 
% Income to RoSCA 16.6 15 9.8 1-80 
-----------------------------------------------------------------Source: Field surveys in Bolivia, 1987. 
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End Notes 
*We appreciate comments and suggestions on this paper from 
F.3.A. Bouman, Donald Larson, Richard Meyer, Salvador Romero, 
Rene Urquidi, Gustavo Vega, and Robert Vogel. We also 
acknowledge the support given to our research by the Agency for 
International Development, Checchi and Company, and Abt 
Associates. 
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